Research: Selected Aspects of Executive Remuneration in Listed Firms: Family vs.Non-Family Firms (Ausgewählte Aspekte der Vorstandsvergütung in Börsennotierten Unternehmen: Familien- vs.Nicht-Familienunternehmen)

Ann-Kristin Achleitner
Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Marc Steffen Rapp
Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Philipp Schaller
Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Michael Wolff
University of Karlsruhe (TH)




Zeitschrift für Corporate Governance, No. 3




Abstract:
    

There
is an ongoing public debate about executive remuneration in listed
firms. Specifically, in the course of the financial crises executive
remuneration principles where claimed to be one of the driving forces
for excessive risktaking and short-termism. Family firms, in contrast,
are often considered to be committed to sustainable long-term
strategies. We examine in which way executive remuneration policies of
family firms differ from their counterparts in non-family firms.
Examining German Prime Standard firms, we find that while there is no
difference in the overall compensation level (when we control for firm
size), family firms use less stock-based compensation vehicles but tie
compensation of their executives closer to accounting based performance
measures. Our results indicate that firms adopt individual compensation
schemes and have important implications for regulators.

Note: downloadable document is in German

Keywords: Executive Compensation, Family Firms, Remuneration, Germany